Responsa for Bava Metzia 131:18

Q. A claims he deposited a pledge with B to secure a loan, and now wishes to redeem it. B claims that the pledge had to be redeemed before a certain date or become forfeited. When the time of payment arrived, A asked for an extension of time and said: "Take formal possession so that the pledge henceforth be yours if I do not repay you before that date". A made no payment on the date due after the extension; B, therefore, claims that the pledge became forfeited. A denies having said, "Take formal possession.……henceforth".
A. Usually a statement, such as A is alleged to have made, is classified as Asmakhta and is not binding. But since B is in possession of the pledged articles, and since B has done a favor to A in lending him money, this satement is no longer classified as Asmakhta and is binding. Therefore, if B takes an oath that A made the statement: "Take formal possession..…henceforth", the pledge belongs to B.
SOURCES: Cr. 1; Pr. 91; L. 333; Rashba I, 1103; Tashbetz, 490; cf. Mord. B. M. 321.

Q. (1) A made a contract with B and gave him a pledge as security that he would fulfill the contract and said, "If I do not carry out the terms of the contract the pledge shall be yours."
(2) C went surety for A to B promising to pay him a certain amount if A should break the terms of the contract.^*That two questions were asked of R. Meir, one regarding security, and another regarding a surety, is seen from the fact that towards the end of this Responsum (in the Pr. 130 version which deals with a pledge) R. Meir uses the phrase וכ׳׳ש ערב לא משתעבד מק׳׳ו המשכון עצמו פטור כ׳׳ש הערב, which seems to indicate that the question was also about a surety. Furthermore, Responsum Cr. 34, gives exactly the same answer as Pr. 130, regarding a surety. Do such transactions fall under the rule of asmakta (אסמכתא)?
A. Both cases fall under the rule of asmakta and are, therefore, not binding.
SOURCES: Cr. 34, Pr. 130; L. 356; Asher, Responsa 108, 27.

Q. A bought silver from B. Having no money to pay for it, he gave B a quantity of gold on condition that should he fail to pay B within three days, B would have the right to raise money against such gold by using it as security on an interest-bearing loan, or by having the money-changers exchange it for money, or by resorting to any other possible manner of raising money. B, however, pledged the gold with C on condition that it become forfeited after two weeks shall have elapsed, should A fail to redeem it within that time. A did not redeem his gold within the stipulated time. Now A demands that B return his gold since he never intended to allow B to pledge his gold on such unusual, and extremely unfavorable, conditions. By the phrase "any other possible manner" he meant to permit the employment of customary methods of raising money against security, and no more. Moreover, B did not necessarily have to raise a loan. He could have taken off a piece of the gold commensurate in value with the money due him, and returned the remainder to A; since gold bullion lends itself to such treatment without the necessity of appraisal [by a court]. B, on the other hand, claims that knowing what a dilatory debtor A was, he refused to do business with him until A gave him the gold and specified that it could be used to raise money "in any possible manner", the last phrase to be taken literally. He further claims that he could not raise the money in any other way than on the terms made with C, and that he informed A about this transaction with C, and that A agreed to it. A, however, denies B's assertions and claims that he was informed of the transaction with C after he had mounted his horse and had been ready to ride on his way, and that he did not realize at the time the meaning of B's words.
A. Even assuming the truth of B's version of his agreement with A, such agreement is considered an asmakhta and is not valid unless accompanied by a kinyan and made before an authoritative court. Therefore, B must pay to A the difference between the value of A's gold and the amount due B. Moreover, B's agreement with C regarding the forfeiture of the pledge is also considered an askmakhta and is invalid.
SOURCES: Cr. 170; L. 331.

Q. A claims he deposited a pledge with B to secure a loan, and now wishes to redeem it. B claims that the pledge had to be redeemed before a certain date or become forfeited. When the time of payment arrived, A asked for an extension of time and said: "Take formal possession so that the pledge henceforth be yours if I do not repay you before that date". A made no payment on the date due after the extension; B, therefore, claims that the pledge became forfeited. A denies having said, "Take formal possession.……henceforth".
A. Usually a statement, such as A is alleged to have made, is classified as Asmakhta and is not binding. But since B is in possession of the pledged articles, and since B has done a favor to A in lending him money, this satement is no longer classified as Asmakhta and is binding. Therefore, if B takes an oath that A made the statement: "Take formal possession..…henceforth", the pledge belongs to B.
SOURCES: Cr. 1; Pr. 91; L. 333; Rashba I, 1103; Tashbetz, 490; cf. Mord. B. M. 321.

Q. (1) A made a contract with B and gave him a pledge as security that he would fulfill the contract and said, "If I do not carry out the terms of the contract the pledge shall be yours."
(2) C went surety for A to B promising to pay him a certain amount if A should break the terms of the contract.^*That two questions were asked of R. Meir, one regarding security, and another regarding a surety, is seen from the fact that towards the end of this Responsum (in the Pr. 130 version which deals with a pledge) R. Meir uses the phrase וכ׳׳ש ערב לא משתעבד מק׳׳ו המשכון עצמו פטור כ׳׳ש הערב, which seems to indicate that the question was also about a surety. Furthermore, Responsum Cr. 34, gives exactly the same answer as Pr. 130, regarding a surety. Do such transactions fall under the rule of asmakta (אסמכתא)?
A. Both cases fall under the rule of asmakta and are, therefore, not binding.
SOURCES: Cr. 34, Pr. 130; L. 356; Asher, Responsa 108, 27.